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Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets: An
Internet Experiment
By MATHIAS DREHMANN, JO¨RG OECHSSLER, AND ANDREAS ROIDER*
We report results of an Internet experiment designed to test the theory of informational
cascades in financial markets (Christopher Avery and Peter Zemsky, 1998). More than
6,400 subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants from an international con-
sulting firm, participated in the experiment. We find that the presence of a flexible
market price prevents herding. The presence of contrarian behavior distorts prices,
however, and even after 20 decisions, convergence to the fundamental value is rare. We
also report some interesting differences with respect to subjects’ fields of study. Reas-
suringly, the behavior of the consultants turns out to be not significantly different from
that of the remaining subjects. (JEL C92, D8, G1)
While the popular press often blames “lemming-
like” behavior of investors for the observed
exuberance in financial markets, the question
whether herding actually occurs in real financial
markets remains, for various reasons, very dif-
ficult to resolve with field data. When investors
are observed taking the same action, this may be
due to herding. But it may also be caused by
investors following the same information, or the
clustering of actions may simply be incidental.
In empirical work, those explanations are diffi-
cult to disentangle, since the private information
of investors is, in general, unobservable. In or-
der to contribute to this question, we conducted
a large-scale Internet experiment based on a
sequential asset market as described by Avery
and Zemsky (1998). An experiment offers an
opportunity to test herding theories directly, since
all fundamentals and the private information of
agents are under control of the experimenter.
Several sources of rational herding are known
in the theoretical literature. For example, when
market participants’ payoffs depend directly on
the behavior of others, herd behavior is natural.
Such payoff externalities cause herding of ana-
lysts or fund managers in models of reputational
herding (e.g., David Scharfstein and Jeremy C.
Stein, 1990), or herd behavior of depositors in
bank runs (e.g., Douglas Diamond and Philip
Dybvig, 1983).1 Even if such payoff externali-
ties are absent, however, herd behavior may be
observed in markets through a process of infor-
mation transmission. Models based purely on
informational externalities were pioneered by
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Abhijit V. Banerjee (1992), Sushil Bikhchan-
dani et al. (1992) (henceforth BHW), and Ivo
Welch (1992). An informational cascade is said
to occur when it becomes rational to ignore
one’s own private information and instead
follow the predecessors’ decisions. Since no
further information is revealed once an infor-
mational cascade has started, inefficiencies oc-
cur even though each individual is behaving
rationally.
Theories of rational herding or informational
cascades are, however, not directly applicable to
financial markets. Market prices are a powerful
mechanism which, in theory, efficiently aggre-
gates private information of traders. In particu-
lar, Avery and Zemsky (1998) (henceforth AZ)
have shown that informational cascades cannot
occur in a simple sequential asset market be-
cause a flexible market price incorporates all
publicly available information. As traders re-
ceive private information, they have an infor-
mational advantage over the market maker.
Thus, rational traders should always follow
their private signal and thereby reveal their in-
formation.2 Note that in this class of sequential
trade models, traders are allowed to buy or sell
only once, and therefore classical price bubbles
driven by traders, who think they can resell the
asset before the bubble bursts, are not possible.3
In reality, herding may nevertheless occur
due to the likely existence of boundedly rational
traders who may be plagued by a variety of
biases and follow more or less plausible rules of
thumb. Imitation, trend chasing, momentum
trading strategies, and the like are possible al-
ternative sources for herd behavior in financial
markets. Finally, there are strategies advocated
by popular guide books and analysts that should
counteract herd behavior.4 In particular, “con-
trarian” or “value strategies” call for buying
assets with low prices relative to some funda-
mental value like earnings, dividends, historical
prices, etc. (For empirical evidence on the prof-
itability of such strategies, see, e.g., Josef La-
konishok et al., 1994, or Rafael La Porta et al.,
1997.)
The Internet experiment we report on in this
paper was designed to address the following
objectives. First, we want to test the theory of
informational cascades in financial markets as
introduced by AZ by taking the theory at face
value. To have the potential to reject their the-
ory, we implement a design that exactly
matches their theoretical setup. The main test
for this theory is whether herding is actually
prevented by market prices. Second, we are
interested in filtering out empirical regularities
that may explain possible deviations from the
theory. In particular, we want to find out
whether traders follow their own signal (which
is rational if all others are rational, too), whether
they engage in herd behavior, or whether they
follow contrarian strategies by trading against
their signal and the market. Third, we use the
variety and size of our subject pool to detect
possible differences in subjects’ behavior as a
function of their personal characteristics. Chief
among those is the question whether business-
men behave differently from college students,
who are usually used in experiments. For this
purpose, we conducted a control experiment
with 267 consultants from McKinsey & Com-
pany, Inc., an international consulting firm.
More than 6,400 subjects participated in our
experiment, in which a substantial amount of
prize money was at stake. The subject pool was
exceptionally educated, with more than 13 per-
cent holding a Ph.D. degree and another 30
percent being Ph.D. students. Almost half the
subjects were educated in natural sciences,
mathematics, or engineering. The main treat-
ments in this experiment were variants of the
basic model by AZ in which a market price
aggregates all publicly available information.
Traders received a private signal and could ob-
serve the history of prices and, in most treat-
2 AZ show that herding may occur in the presence of
multidimensional uncertainty, even though informational
cascades remain impossible. See also Marco Cipriani and
Antonio Guarino (2001), who show that informational cas-
cades are possible if agents are heterogeneous such that
gains from trade exist.
3 For a survey of theories of rational bubbles and herd-
ing, see, e.g., Markus Brunnermeier (2001). For a survey of
experimental research on bubbles in asset markets, see, e.g.,
Shyam Sunder (1995). For recent work in this area, see, e.g.,
Cars Hommes et al. (2002), or John Hey and Andrea Mo-
rone (2004).
4 See, e.g., the investment classic Contrarian Investment
Strategies by David Dreman (1979, 1998), or his column
“The Contrarian” in Forbes Magazine.
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ments, the decisions of their predecessors. The
large number of participants in the experiment
allowed us to introduce a variety of modifica-
tions of the basic model. For example, we ex-
plored many different combinations of a priori
probabilities and signal precisions to check for
robustness.
As mentioned above, in our main treatments
we aimed at matching AZ’s theoretical setup
exactly. Thus, when setting prices, the market
maker (which in the experiment was played by
the computer) assumed that all subjects behaved
rationally. In the course of the experiment, it
emerged, however, that a substantial fraction of
subjects did not follow their own signal. A
human market maker in a real market would
presumably learn this over time and adjust his
pricing behavior accordingly.5 As a conse-
quence, we studied two additional “error” treat-
ments, where the market makers’ price-setting
rule was modified to account for the fact that
subjects do not always adhere to their signals.
The first of these treatments is in the spirit of the
literature on noise traders. In this treatment the
market maker assumed that, in addition to ra-
tional traders, there is a fixed proportion of
noise traders, whose decisions are uninforma-
tive. In the second “error” treatment, building
on the notion of quantal response equilibrium of
Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey
(1995, 1998), the market maker based his pric-
ing behavior on the assumption that the propen-
sity to follow one’s own signal might depend on
the history of previous decisions.
Finally, for comparison, we studied two
benchmarks. First, we conducted treatments
without market prices corresponding to the ba-
sic model of BHW. Second, another important
benchmark is treatments in which subjects
could observe not only the decisions of their
predecessors but also their private signals. In
those treatments, doubts about the rationality of
others cannot be an issue.
Our experiment complements a large empir-
ical literature with field data. Beginning with
Lakonishok et al. (1992), researchers were an-
alyzing the tendency of fund managers, security
analysts (Welch, 2000), or investment newslet-
ters (John R. Graham, 1999) to herd (for sur-
veys, see, e.g., Bikhchandani and Sunil Sharma,
2000; Kent Daniel et al., 2002; or David Hirsh-
leifer and Siew Hong Teoh, 2003). However, as
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) note, it will always
be difficult to empirically disentangle the mix-
ture of reputational effects, informational ef-
fects, direct payoff externalities, and imperfect
rationality.
Following Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A.
Holt (1997), there is by now a well-established
experimental literature on cascade and herding
models.6 To our knowledge, however, there is
only one other experiment on cascades in finan-
cial markets with flexible prices (conducted by
Cipriani and Guarino, 2005). Some of our treat-
ments are very close to their experiment, and we
will comment at several places in this paper on
their results.7
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section
I, we first discuss the theoretical predictions for
the basic BHW model without prices, and then
for the AZ model with market prices. In Section
II, we describe the experimental design, in par-
ticular the different treatments, the recruitment,
the characteristics of the subject pool, and the
implementation on the Internet.8
The results of the experiment are presented in
Section III. Perhaps the most important result is
that we find no evidence of herding or imitative
5 We thank the co-editor Douglas Bernheim for pointing
this out.
6 See, e.g., Robert Goidel and Todd Shields (1994), Kene
Bounmy et al. (1998), Marc Willinger and Anthony
Ziegelmeyer (1998), Louise Allsopp and Hey (1999),
Klarita Sadiraj et al. (1999), Steffen Huck and Oechssler
(2000), Masahiro Ashiya and Takero Doi (2001), Angela
Hung and Charles Plott (2001), Markus No¨th et al. (1999),
Clemens Oberhammer and Andreas Stiehler (2001), No¨th
and Martin Weber (2003), Plott et al. (2003), Dorothea
Ku¨bler and Georg Weizsa¨cker (2004), and Carlo Kra¨mer et
al. (2005).
7 Cipriani and Guarino (2005) conducted a paper-and-
pencil experiment with a 50–70 probability combination
and 12 traders in a group. When we conducted our experi-
ment, we were not aware of their experiment. It is clear,
however, that their experiment has precedence. In our no-
tation (see Table 1) they ran treatments that are comparable
to P  D, P  D, BHW, and an additional treatment in
which two subjects acted as market makers.
8 Conducting experiments on the Internet is still novel.
For first experiences, see, e.g., Robert Forsythe et al. (1992,
1999), David Lucking-Reiley (1999), Vital Anderhub et al.
(2001), Gary Charness et al. (2001), Tal Shavit et al. (2001),
Antoni Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002), and Werner Gu¨th et
al. (2003). For technical issues, see, e.g., Ben Greiner et al.
(2003). The Internet is also used to provide a platform to
run economic experiments for interactive learning (Holt,
forthcoming).
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behavior in the presence of a flexible market
price. While this aspect is consistent with the
AZ model, other theoretical predictions of the
AZ model find no support in the data. Recall
that the AZ model predicts that all subjects
follow their private information. In the experi-
ment, this happens only in between 50 percent
and 70 percent of cases. Clearly, such behavior
yields substantial deviations of actual prices
from full information prices that would be ob-
tained if everyone behaved rationally. We find
that, on average, actual prices are less extreme
than full information prices, which implies that
volatility in the actual market is lower than it
should be theoretically. While we do not ob-
serve herding, we find considerable support for
the existence of “contrarian” behavior. When
the price of asset A is high, subjects often buy
asset B, even if their own private information
and the decisions of their predecessors favor
asset A, and vice versa. Since we find that
contrarian behavior can be profitable at very
low or very high prices, we explore the possi-
bility that subjects have doubts about the ratio-
nality of others, and consequently mistrust their
decisions. We find that error models (like the
quantal response models of McKelvey and Pal-
frey, 1995 and 1998), which explicitly take into
account the possibility of mistakes, are partly
able to rationalize contrarian behavior.
The large number of participants allows us to
further conduct a number of interesting compar-
isons of behavior with respect to demographics,
fields of studies, etc. There seems to be no
significant difference between male and female
subjects, or between subjects with and without a
college education. Subjects holding a Ph.D. de-
gree, however, are slightly more in line with
theoretical predictions. Maybe it does not come
as a surprise that when we look at selected fields
of study, physicists perform the best in terms of
“rationality” (i.e., performance according to
theory) and psychologists the worst. However,
since “rational” behavior is profitable only
when other subjects behave rationally as well,
good performance in terms of “rationality” does
not imply good performance in terms of profits.
Indeed, the ranking in terms of profits is just the
opposite: psychologists are the best and physi-
cists the worst. Finally, it is reassuring that the
consultants in our control experiment did not
behave significantly different from the subjects
in the main experiment, which is important for
the outside validity of our experiment. Section
IV contains a conclusion. The various appendi-
ces mentioned below are available on the AER
Web site (http://www.e-aer.org/dec05_app_
oechssler.pdf).
I. Theoretical Predictions
Consider a number of investors who have to
decide sequentially whether to invest in one of
two assets, A or B. For simplicity, each investor
can buy only one unit of asset A or one unit of
asset B (sometimes we also allow for the pos-
sibility that no trade occurs). Investors are risk
neutral and have the same a priori beliefs re-
garding the probabilities of success of the two
investments. Specifically, only one asset is suc-
cessful and worth ten units at the end of the
period, while the other is worth zero. The suc-
cessful asset is determined at the beginning of
the experiment and each investor knows the a
priori probability that asset S is successful, P(S),
S  {A, B}.
The timing is as follows. Investors move se-
quentially in some exogenous order, with each
investor moving only once. Before deciding
what to buy, each investor receives a private,
informative signal a or b regarding the success
of the assets. The signal’s precision is P(aA) 
P(bB)  0.5, which is the conditional proba-
bility that signal s  {a, b} occurs, given the
true state is S  {A, B}. For all investors, the
signal is identically and independently distrib-
uted conditional on the true state. This is com-
monly known. Each investor can observe the
decisions of all his predecessors.
We consider two principal versions of this
model: one in which the price of the two assets
is fixed (and set equal to zero for simplicity) and
one in which the prices of A and B are market
prices that reflect publicly available informa-
tion. The version with zero prices is equivalent
to the basic model studied by BHW. The model
with market prices has been studied by AZ.
A. The BHW Model
All investors can invest either in asset A or
B—but not both—at zero cost.9 Clearly, an in-
9 Introducing a fixed price would not alter the strategic
setting.
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vestor with t predecessors will choose A if and
only if the conditional probability that A is
successful given all private and public informa-
tion P(AHt, s) is greater than 1⁄2,10 where Ht
denotes the observable history of the decisions
of all predecessors up to round t, and s  a, b
the private signal.
The difficulty lies in the interpretation of
decisions of predecessors. Assuming that all
predecessors are perfectly rational Bayesians,
an investor who is a Bayesian himself follows
his private signal and thereby reveals it, unless
an informational cascade has started. If a signal
can be deduced from the chosen action, it is
called an imputed signal.
A cascade on asset S, an S-cascade, starts
when an investor should buy asset S regardless
of his own signal, i.e., when P(SHt, s)  1⁄2, for
s  a, b. Depending on the a priori probabilities
and the signal precisions, this requires a certain
number of (imputed) a or b signals. In all cases,
however, the onset of a cascade depends only
on the net number of a-signals  #a #b that
can be imputed from the history of decisions
(i.e.,  is defined net of the signal of the current
investor).
We demonstrate the calculations for our main
probability combination 55–60, that is, P(A) 
0.55 and P(aA)  P(bB)  0.6. The first
investor should always follow his own signal
since even if he receives a b-signal, P(Bb) 
1  P(Ab)  1⁄2 holds. Hence, the signal of the
first player can be imputed from his action. If
the first investor chooses A, the second should
already disregard his own signal: even with a b
signal, the second investor should choose A since
(1)
PAab 
PabAPA
PabAPA  PabBPB
 0.55,
which is the a priori probability for A. The two
signals a and b cancel out and the decision
should follow the a priori probability. In this
case, the third player cannot impute the signal
of the second player and thus faces a similar
decision problem as the second player. Hence,
after one A, an A-cascade starts, i.e., when  
1. Likewise, it can be shown that a B-cascade
must start for   2. If all agents are rational
Bayesians, a cascade is never broken once it is
started, and information accumulation stops
(i.e., 2    1 at all times unless errors
occur).
In an experiment, one can hardly assume that
all subjects are rational Bayesians, let alone that
all subjects believe that all other subjects are
rational. In particular, one has to make provi-
sions for the fact that irrational behavior may be
unambiguously observed (as when the second
subject chooses B following an A by the first
subject in the example above).
To account for possible non-Bayesian behav-
ior, we assume that subjects impute signals in
the following way. If there is no history of
signals that can explain an observed action,
given that all predecessors behaved according to
the Bayesian calculus explained above, we say
that the action is in “obvious contradiction to
Bayes’s rule.” If a decision is not in obvious
contradiction to Bayes’s rule, the imputed sig-
nal equals the decision unless a cascade has
started, in which case no signal can be extracted
from the respective decision. For a decision
which, given the history of imputed signals,
obviously violates Bayes’s rule (i.e., if a cas-
cade is broken), we considered two variants: (a)
successors ignore the decision of the deviator;
and (b) subjects assume that the deviator fol-
lowed his private signal. As it turns out, the
empirical truth lies somewhere in the middle,
but both assumptions yield qualitatively the
same results. In the following, we report only
results based on rule (b). We say that an agent is
“rational under common knowledge of rational-
ity” (henceforth: ruck) if he follows Bayesian
updating with respect to the imputed signal his-
tory and his own signal. In the following, it is
important to remember that ruck is based on the
assumption that all predecessors are rational. It
may be perfectly rational to deviate from ruck if
a subject thinks that his predecessors are not
rational.
Of course, no ambiguity with regard to ratio-
nality arises when not only decisions but also
signals of others are observable. In this case, an
optimal decision is purely a matter of calculat-
ing conditional probabilities. As mentioned
10 In most of our treatments, ties in expected profit
cannot occur. When a tie-breaking rule is required, it is
explicitly mentioned below.
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above, we also consider such a setting in some
of our treatments.
B. The Avery/Zemsky Model
To keep the experiment as simple as possible,
we consider the simplest version of the AZ
model (cf. Avery and Zemsky, 1998, sect. I),
which is the BHW model enriched by a flexible
price. In this model, the price is set by a market
maker who efficiently incorporates all publicly
available information.11 The crucial question is
how the existence of a market price changes the
possibilities for herding.
Let pt denote the market price of asset A in
round t and assume, as above, that a successful
asset pays out ten units in the end. Hence,
(2) pt  10PAHt .
The price of B is always equal to 10  pt since
P(AHt)  1  P(BHt).
The decision of an investor is straightfor-
ward. An investment in A is profitable in expec-
tation if and only if
(3) 10PAHt , s  pt  0,
that is, if and only if s  a. Likewise, an
investment in B is profitable if and only if s 
b. In other words, each investor follows his
private signal. All information is revealed, and
therefore it is incorporated into the price imme-
diately after each decision. This implies that the
price is semistrong efficient, i.e., at any point in
time, the price incorporates all publicly avail-
able information. The price is a martingale with
respect to public information, i.e., E(pt1Ht) 
pt for all t, and one cannot take advantage of the
knowledge of historical price movements to
earn superior returns. As everyone follows his
signal, rational herding cannot occur. Note that
not trading is never optimal (unless one intro-
duces transaction costs) because subjects al-
ways have an informational advantage over the
market maker.
Again, the problem becomes more compli-
cated when investors cannot be fully confident
that their predecessors behaved rationally. Sup-
pose, instead, the investor believes that (some)
prior decisions were taken randomly. A regres-
sion to the mean argument implies that high
prices are likely to be overvalued and low prices
undervalued. Thus, it may pay for an investor to
trade against the market and against his own
signal. Such investors are called contrarians
even though rational contrarians would never
occur in our setting if all investors were known
to be rational.
II. Experimental Design
More than 6,400 subjects participated in our
online experiment, which was available for a
period of about six weeks in 2002 on our Web
site, http://www.a-oder-b.de, which is German
for a-or-b.12 Subjects decided in sequence and
were able to observe the actual decisions of
prior participants in their respective groups. In
general, the group size was 20. Subjects were
asked to make decisions in three independent
groups. We call the first decision stage 1, the
second stage 2, and the third stage 3. Thus, in
total, there were more than 19,000 decisions.
Common to all treatments are the following
features. Subjects had to choose between invest-
ment opportunities A and B. (In some price
treatments, there was also the option of choos-
ing neither, which we label N.) Only one of the
two could be successful and, if so, would pay 10
“Lotto-Euros.” The unsuccessful investment
paid nothing. Subjects were told the a priori
probabilities P(S), which varied among our
treatments. Furthermore, they were told that
they would receive a tip by an investment
banker that was reliable with a specified prob-
ability P(sS), which also varied among our
treatments. Subjects were informed that all prior
investors in their group had received a tip by
other investment bankers and that these tips
were independent of theirs. (See Web Appendix
11 In contrast to AZ’s general model, which is in the
spirit of Lawrence Glosten and Paul Milgrom (1985), the
simple model does not incorporate uninformed traders, and
therefore has no bid–ask spread. With only informed trad-
ers, setting a bid–ask spread to ensure a zero profit condition
for the market maker would lead to a market breakdown.
The results of the simple model, however, carry over to a
more complex world with informed and uninformed traders
and a market maker setting bid–ask spreads (see AZ, Prop-
osition 3). As in the experiment, the market maker was
played by the computer, the possibility of losses was not an
issue. 12 Some follow-up treatments were run in January 2004.
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A for a translation of the instructions.) In the
next subsection, we introduce the details of the
different treatments.
A. Treatments
Given the large number of participants, we
were able to explore a variety of different ques-
tions, information conditions, probability com-
binations, etc. In this paper, we focus on
treatments that are relevant to financial markets,
i.e., treatments that follow the basic setup of
AZ, where a market price exists which reflects
all publicly available information. In two addi-
tional treatments, we deviate from the basic
setup by assuming that subjects make errors
with some probability, and that the market
maker takes this into account. For comparison
we also include two treatments without prices
which follow the basic model of BHW.
Table 1 lists the main features of all treat-
ments. Names of treatments with market prices
start with P followed byD when, additional to
the price history, the decisions of all prior in-
vestors are observable, or D when only the
price history is observable. Hence, in treatments
D, subjects could observe how decisions in-
fluenced prices. A N denotes treatments in
which the “no-trade” option was absent, i.e.,
subjects were forced to buy either A or B.
In our main treatments P and P  N, we used
the same pricing rule as in AZ. That is, prices
were set to reflect all public information that
was available at the respective points in time.
The computer took the role of the market maker
and assumed that all decisions were formed
according to ruck (see (2)), i.e., that all subjects
followed their own signal, unless this could be
unambiguously rejected (which could occur
only in case of an irrational no-trade decision).
In the latter case, no signal could be imputed,
and hence the price remained constant (see Web
Appendix B for a detailed description of how
prices were formed in each of our treatments).
To explain the pricing rule to subjects is not
a simple task. Therefore, we chose several dif-
ferent ways of presenting it. In the main treat-
ment groups P and P  N, subjects were told in
the instructions that “share prices are deter-
mined by supply and demand such that outside
investors, who can observe the history of trades
but not the tips given by the investment bankers,
have no incentive to trade, i.e., an outside in-
vestor could not expect to profit from buying or
selling one of the shares.” In treatments indexed
by an ‘e’, subjects were told, in addition, that
prices are conditional expected values given the
history of decisions.13
In treatments indexed by ‘t’, subjects were
13 We have also used two versions of the instructions, an
old and a new version, the latter being more precise about
TABLE 1—TREATMENTS
Treatment
group Treatment Description
P P  D Price, all decisions observable
P  D Price, no decisions observable
Pe  D P  D and explicit formulation
Pt  D P  D and table to explain pricing rule
P  N P  D  N P  D, and N not possible
P  D  N P  D, and N not possible
Pt  D  N P  D  N and table to explain pricing rule
P  N  AS P  AS  D  N P  D  N and all signals observable
P  AS  D  N P  D  N and all signals observable
P  Nerror Pf  D  N Pt  D  N and pricing rule with constant error
P  D  N P  D  N and pricing rule with variable error
BHW Bikhchandani/Hirshleifer/Welch
BHW  AS BHW and all signals observable
Note: The symbol N denotes the option of not trading.
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given a table instead of the explanation via
outside investors. This table explicitly listed the
price resulting from each possible net number of
A-decisions by predecessors (i.e., the number of
predecessors who chose A minus the number of
predecessors who chose B). The instructions
also contained three examples that demon-
strated the way the price depended on the net
number of A decisions.
The P  N  AS treatments were identical to
the corresponding P  N treatments, except that
subjects (and the market maker) were also able
to observe all signals of predecessors. In those
treatments, subjects did not need to worry about
the rationality of their predecessors’ actions.
If all agents act in line with theory, all of the
price treatments above (P, P  N, and P  N 
AS) have the same theoretical prediction: ev-
eryone should follow his own signal.14 Whether
past decisions are observable or not is irrele-
vant, since the price history fully reveals past
decisions, and the decision history yields no
additional information. Furthermore, the no-
trade option N should not alter the results, be-
cause not trading is never optimal.
Up to now, we have assumed that the com-
puter as market maker bases the price on the
assumption that subjects follow their signal (as
predicted by theory). After running most of the
experiment, however, we observed substantial
deviations from the theoretical predictions. A
human market maker in a real market would
presumably learn this over time and adjust his
pricing rule.15 To check whether the chosen
pricing rule biased our results, we introduced
two additional “error” treatments in which
prices are set under the assumption that subjects
sometimes deviate from the theoretical predic-
tions. Treatment Pf  D  N is the same as
Pt  D  N, except that price calculations were
based on the assumption that each subject
chooses only with probability 0.6542 the asset
that is consistent with her signal. This probabil-
ity was based on the empirically observed fre-
quency with which subjects followed their
signal in treatments P  N  AS (in which
there was no need to worry about rationality of
others).16 As it turned out, the choice of this
error probability was approximately validated
ex post by the actual error probabilities ob-
served in the respective treatments (see footnote
26).
The second error treatment, P  D  N, is
similar to Pf  D  N except that, based on the
concept of quantal response equilibrium of
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998), the error
probabilities were calculated separately for each
history of decisions, which implied that error
probabilities were higher for more extreme
prices. These error probabilities were also cal-
culated based on data from treatment P  N 
AS (see Web Appendix B for details). As in
treatment Pf  D  N, it turned out that the
assumed error rate was not significantly differ-
ent from the actually observed one.
In treatments P  Nerror, it is rational to
follow one’s own signal if one assumes (which
we shall do in the following) that subjects an-
ticipate other subjects to make errors with the
same probabilities that the market maker as-
sumes when setting prices.
Finally, treatments without prices are denoted
by BHW. The no-price treatment, in which all
signals of predecessors were observable, is de-
noted by BHW  AS.
In the price treatments, cascades should never
happen, regardless of the probability parameters
of the model. In the no-price treatments, the
likelihood of cascades crucially depends on the
a priori probability of the true state and the
precision of the private signals. We have there-
fore looked at a number of different probability
combinations shown in Table 2. For each prob-
ability combination, the last two columns in
Table 2 give the minimum (maximum) netthe independence of the investment bankers’ tips. See Sec-
tion III H for more on this.
14 In P  N  AS, this holds independent of the behav-
ior of predecessors because the market maker is assumed to
be able to observe the signals, and hence in these treatments
actual prices equal full information prices (see Section
III C).
15 Interestingly, Cipriani and Guarino (2005) ran a treat-
ment in which the market maker was played by subjects.
They find no significant difference to the treatment in which
the market maker followed the rule of Avery and Zemsky
(1998).
16 Note that the market maker would arrive at the same
prices if, alternatively, he would assume that the decisions
of a certain fixed proportion of subjects are uninformative
(i.e., that there are noise traders), while the remaining sub-
jects always follow their own signal. However, at least in
our data it seems to be the case that the first interpretation is
more appropriate (see Section III F for details).
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number of imputed signals necessary for the
start of an A cascade (B cascade), respectively.
Payoffs in “Lotto-Euros” were calculated as
follows. If a subject chose the correct invest-
ment, he received 10 Lotto-Euros. This was the
final payoff for this task in the BHW treatments.
In the price treatments, subjects received addi-
tionally an endowment of 11 for each task to
avoid losses because they had to pay the market
price for their investment (which could vary be-
tween 0 and 10). Thus, the payoff from each task
was 11  market price  10 (if successful).
B. Recruiting and Payment
The experiment was announced in several ads
in the science section of the largest German
weekly newspaper Die Zeit, two popular sci-
ence magazines, and two national student mag-
azines. Posters were distributed at most science
faculties at German universities. Finally,
e-mails were sent to Ph.D. students and post-
doctoral students in science and economics de-
partments at 35 universities in Germany. The
Web site www.a-oder-b.de was linked to the
Laboratory for Experimental Research in Eco-
nomics at the University of Bonn and to the
sponsor McKinsey & Company to demonstrate
that the experiment had a proper scientific back-
ground and that the promised financial rewards
were credible.
Payoffs in the experiment, denoted in Lotto-
Euros, were calculated as described in the pre-
vious subsection. Each Lotto-Euro was a ticket
in a lottery to win one of our main prizes. In
total, there were 11 prizes of 1,000 Euros each
and eight prizes of 100 Euros. The odds in those
lotteries were fixed in advance and known to
subjects.17 Each subject, when logging in on our
Web site, was told explicitly the odds per lottery
ticket for winning one of our main prizes. Thus,
maximizing the probability of winning one of
the prizes was equivalent to maximizing the
number of lottery tickets. All winners were no-
tified by mail, and their prize money was paid
through bank transfers.
In Phase I of the experiment, 1,409 subjects
played with high-powered incentives where
each of 40,000 lottery tickets had an equal
chance of winning one of five prizes of 1,000
Euros. Since subjects played on average for 15
minutes, they were making an expected hourly
“wage” of 14.19 Euros, which is comparable to
a very good student job and to pay in laboratory
experiments. In Phase II, each of 90,000 lottery
tickets had an equal chance of winning one of
another five prizes of 1,000 Euros. Finally, in
Phase III, 1,162 subjects competed for the re-
maining 1,000 Euros. Only in this Phase III of
the experiment, where almost no monetary in-
centives were provided, did subjects not know
how many lottery tickets were issued in the
respective phase. This payment scheme was due
to the fact that an unexpectedly large number of
subjects participated in our experiment. But it
also gave us the chance to test the role of
incentives in such a setting.
Phase IV consists of experiments added in
January of 2004, where the number of lottery
tickets issued was again fixed and known to the
subjects. In this phase, 320 subjects competed
for eight prizes of 100 Euros each, which
amounted to an expected hourly “wage” of
about 10 Euros. Subjects in this phase played
only treatment groups P  N  AS and P 
Nerror, and treatments Pt  D and Pt  D  N.
Additionally, there was a control group of
267 consultants from McKinsey & Company
17 This was achieved by allocating a given set of prizes
to a fixed number of lottery tickets, some of which had the
potential of going undistributed. No prize would have been
paid when one of the few undistributed tickets had won (but
this did not happen). Note that in the instructions (see Web
Appendix A), it was not made explicit that, in principle, an
undistributed ticket might win. This might have led (some)
subjects to believe that only distributed tickets could be
winners. Even if such ambiguity arose, however, its effect
on incentives is likely to be mild. For example, in Phase I of
the experiment, where high-powered incentives were pro-
vided, only 0.3 percent of tickets were not distributed. We
thank a referee for pointing out this issue.
TABLE 2—PROBABILITIES
A priori
probability
P(A)
Signal precision
P(aA) A-cascade B-cascade
55 60 1 2
51 55 1 2
55 80 1 2
50# 66 2 2
60# 60 1 3
60 51 9 12
60 55 1 4
Note: In cases marked by #, we employ the tie-breaking rule
that subjects follow their own signal when indifferent.
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who participated in the experiment on the
same Web site a few weeks before the start of
the main experiment in 2002. The subjects of
the control experiment were recruited by an
internal e-mail to all German consultants of
McKinsey. Subjects knew that all other sub-
jects were also consultants. About a third of
those contacted participated. These subjects
had the chance to win eight vouchers for a
nice dinner for two in a restaurant, each worth
150 Euros.
C. Subject Pool and Implementation
In total, 6,419 subjects finished our experiment,
of which 6,152 participated in the main experi-
ment and 267 in the control experiment with con-
sultants.18 Of all subjects, 13.3 percent had a
Ph.D. degree and 30.2 percent were Ph.D. stu-
dents. All but 6.4 percent of the subjects had either
finished a first university degree or were currently
enrolled at a university. Average age was 28.3,
and 28.1 percent of subjects were female. Consid-
ering the number of Ph.D. students and persons
with Ph.D. degrees, we believe we succeeded in
recruiting a fairly bright subject pool. Further-
more, in contrast to most experiments in econom-
ics, our subjects came from a broad range of fields
(about 50 percent were from natural sciences or
engineering; others included business, economics,
liberal arts, and law).
When arriving on our Web site, subjects read a
screen that introduced the general problem and the
rules of the game. Subsequently, subjects were
asked for some personal information, like name,
mailing address, e-mail, field of study, age, etc.
Subjects were allowed to play only if all informa-
tion requested was actually provided. This was
also a measure to prevent subjects from playing
twice: in order to win in the lottery, one had to
give a correct mailing address, and the program
ensured that the same name–postal code combi-
nation as well as the same e-mail address could
play only once. We also used cookies to prevent
using the same computer twice.19
After entering the personal information, sub-
jects were randomly placed in a currently active
group,20 and had to make their first decision.
Afterward, they were randomly placed in an-
other active group for the second task, and then
in a third group for the final task. No feedback
about results was given until the subject had
completed all three tasks. Even then they were
told only how many Lotto-Euros they had won.
Usually the tasks for each subject came from
different treatments (except in Phase IV). Fi-
nally, we asked subjects for voluntary feedback
as to how they formed their decisions, and 721
subjects sent response e-mails.
III. Results
For the evaluation of the results, we consider
the following three measures. (a) The variable
ruck is meant to capture how well theory ex-
plains the data. In all treatments (except P 
N  AS and P  Nerror) average ruck is defined
as the fraction of decisions that were rational
under the assumption of common knowledge of
rationality of predecessors.21 (b) The fraction of
cases in which subjects followed their own sig-
nal is denoted by own. (c) Finally, the actual
market price pt is compared to the full informa-
tion price p*t, which would have resulted if the
market maker could have directly observed the
signals.22
Before we present the results, it might be
useful to collect the theoretical hypotheses for
18 There were 835 individuals who logged on but did not
finish the experiment. Their decisions were not included in
the history Ht since they did not face monetary incentives
(payment was conditional on finishing all three stages of the
experiment).
19 It will never be possible to completely prevent clever
people from playing more than once. We are confident,
however, that not many such attempts were successful, and
given the size of the subject pool, those few probably do not
matter much. It turned out that less than 5 percent of the
participants entered an invalid e-mail address (including
unintentional typos), and these subjects did not behave
significantly differently (see Section III G).
20 A group was active when it was neither full nor closed
(i.e., when another subject was active in this group). We
also ensured that subjects who logged on at about the same
time were allocated to different treatments to prevent “ob-
servational learning” in case two subjects sat next to each
other in a computer pool.
21 In the full information treatments P  N  AS,
common knowledge of rationality of predecessors is not
required. In treatments P  Nerror, average ruck is defined
as the fraction of decisions that were rational given the
assumption that the market maker’s model of the behavior
of one’s predecessors was correct.
22 In all but P  Nerror, the full information price is
equivalent to the theoretical price that would have resulted
if all subjects had behaved according to ruck.
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our various treatments (see the discussions in
Sections I and II A above). (a) In all price
treatments, subjects should follow their own
signal (ruck  own  1). (b) There should not
be any difference between any of the treatments
in P and P  N, regardless of whether prior
decisions were observable or not (D or D)
or whether the option N was available or not. (c)
In treatment groups P and P  N, actual prices
pt should match full information prices p*t. (d)
The no-trade option (N) should never be used.
(e) In treatment BHW, subjects should follow
the cascade behavior described in the last two
columns of Table 2 if they believe that their
predecessors are rational (ruck  1). (f) In
treatment BHW  AS, subjects should follow
the cascade behavior of Table 2 regardless of
what they believe about others (ruck  1). (g)
Different prior probabilities and signal preci-
sions should not alter average ruck.
A. Preliminary Data Analysis
Table 3 gives the number of groups in our
experiment separately for each combination of
treatments and probabilities. As stated above,
the group size was usually 20 (it was ten for
treatment BHW  AS and the control experi-
ment with consultants).
Since reporting results for each variation
would be tedious, we checked first which vari-
ants of our treatments could be grouped together
and pooled. We did this by comparing treat-
ments with respect to the variables ruck and
own, both by nonparametric MWU tests and
regressions, taking each group as one observa-
tion. The following summarizes the results of
those tests:
Incentives. The phase of the experiment (re-
call that incentives were different in Phases I
through IV) had no significant effect. This implies
that—at least in this experiment—incentives
seem to matter little as compared to the intrinsic
motivation of subjects to perform well.23
Stage. The stage of the task (whether a task
was the first, second, or third a subject per-
formed in) did not matter. This shows that
learning effects do not play a significant role.
This is in line with our expectations, given that
subjects did not receive any feedback until the
end of the game.
23 Colin Camerer and Robin Hogarth (1999) provide a
survey of studies that look at the effects of monetary
incentives.
TABLE 3—NUMBER OF GROUPS PER TREATMENT AND PROBABILITY COMBINATION
Treatment
Probability combination
Total50–66 51–55 55–60 55–80 60–51 60–55 60–60
P  D 12 6 26  15c 8 — 6 4 77
P  D 11 6 20  9c 1 — — 3 50
Pe  D 12 6 12 6 — 6 — 42
Pt  D — — 9 — — — — 9
P  D  N 10 6 18 — — — — 40
Pt  D  N — — 9 — — — — 9
P  D  N 17 6 18 — — — — 41
P  AS  D  N — — 6 — — — — 6
P  AS  D  N — — 6 — — — — 6
Pf  D  N — — 9 — — — — 9
P  D  N — — 9 — — — — 9
BHW 12 17 65  15c 8 12 6 15 150
BHW  AS 12 18 70  9c 2 12 — 12 135
Total 92 65 277  48c 25 24 18 34 583
Notes: As a convention, the first number in x–y is the prior and the second the signal precision used in the experiment. The
symbol c denotes groups in the control experiment with consultants.
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Instructions. Presenting the pricing rule
through a table (t) does not change the results,
as there are no significant differences between
P  D and Pt  D, or between P  D  N and
Pt  D  N, respectively. Also, a more explicit
formulation for the price formation process (e)
was irrelevant, which, given that a large fraction
of the subject pool has a mathematical back-
ground, is reassuring and indicates that subjects
understood how prices were formed. The two
versions of the instructions (see footnote 13)
made no significant difference.
Observability of decisions. The observability
of decisions of predecessors did not matter,
which implies that subjects understood how
their predecessors’ decisions are reflected in the
price history.
With the exception of P  Nerror, we will,
therefore, report only results on the treatment
group level (see Table 1) because treatments
within these treatment groups did not signifi-
cantly differ from each other.24 In the follow-
ing, we will present the results from the main
experiment. Results from the control experiment
with consultants are reported in Section III H.
B. Summary Statistics
In this subsection, we present summary sta-
tistics on the main variables of interest, ruck and
own. Recall that theory predicts ruck  1 for all
treatments. Table 4 shows average ruck for
seven treatment groups and the probability
combinations 55–60 and 50–66.25
In the P  N treatments, average ruck is 65
percent and 68 percent, respectively, i.e.,
roughly two-thirds of subjects in these treat-
ments acted in line with theory. In the P  N 
AS treatments and the two error treatments Pf
D  N and P  D  N, average ruck is
between 65 percent and 70 percent.26 None of
the treatments without the N option (N) is
significantly different at any conventional level
according to pairwise nonparametric MWU-
tests. In the P treatments ruck is substantially
and significantly lower, probably because an
additional mistake can be made, namely not to
trade.27 In fact, N was chosen on average 19
percent of the time in the P treatments, which
was never ruck.28 Among subjects who did buy
A or B in treatment P, average ruck was similar
to the N treatments, namely 66 percent (71
percent) in probability combination 55–60 (50–
66). Average ruck in BHW reaches 66 percent
and 78 percent, respectively. Even in BHW 
24 Differences across treatment groups are discussed
below.
25 Since in the BHW treatments the observed ruck varies
with different probability combinations, we compare treat-
ments only for our main probability combinations 50–66
and 55–60. In Web Appendix C, we display the average
values of ruck and own across all probability combinations.
26 Binomial tests do not allow to reject the hypothesis
that for any observed price the actual probability with which
subjects followed their signal in Pf  D  N is equal to the
ex ante assumed probability of 0.6542 (pooled over all
prices in treatment Pf  D  N, subjects followed their
signal in 68 percent of cases (see Table 4)). In the price
calculation in treatment P  D  N, we used an error rate
  0.5552 (derived from treatment P  N  AS). Esti-
mating such an error rate ex post from the data of P D
N (see Section III F and in particular footnote 44) yields
0.471 (standard deviation 0.09), which is not significantly
different from 0.5552.
27 Risk aversion cannot really account for this behavior,
since we employed a binary lottery procedure which, at least
theoretically, should induce risk neutrality (see Alvin Roth
and Michael Malouf, 1979, or Joyce Berg et al., 1986).
28 These findings are roughly in line with Cipriani and
Guarino (2005). In their flexible price treatment (with prob-
ability combination 50–70) they report that 65 percent (22
percent) of subjects acted rationally (did not trade), which is
comparable to our treatments P 50–66 where the respective
numbers are 59 percent and 24 percent.
TABLE 4—AVERAGE ruck
Probability
combination P P  N P  N  AS Pf  D  N P  D  N BHW BHW  AS
55–60 0.54 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.66 0.72
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14)
50–66 0.59 0.68 — — — 0.78 0.76
(0.11) (0.09) — — — (0.09) (0.12)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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AS, where there is no need to worry about the
rationality of others, ruck reaches only 72 per-
cent and 76 percent, respectively.
A curious pattern appears with respect to the
percentage of subjects who followed their own
signals (own). In the 55–60 and 50–66 BHW
sessions, 75 percent of subjects (see Web Ap-
pendix C) follow their own signal (often in
contrast to what they should do).29 On the other
hand, in the price treatments, only between 54
percent and 70 percent of subjects follow their
own signal, when following the own signal is
always ruck.
Finally, we can take a more detailed look
how ruck varies for different probability com-
binations. Table 5 shows ruck levels for treat-
ment P. Taking our main treatment 55–60 as
base, only 50–66 shows a significant difference
at the 5-percent level, according to MWU
tests.30 Hence, results from the price treatments
seem to be fairly robust across probability
combinations.
C. Actual versus Full Information Prices
The key question with respect to the efficient
market hypothesis is whether prices accurately
reflect the information in the market. Clearly,
informational efficiency presupposes that indi-
vidual traders act rationally on their information
and, as we have seen in the last subsections, this
is not always the case in our experiment. Con-
sequently, in this subsection, we look at how
strongly prices are distorted relative to the full
information benchmark. We define the full in-
formation price p*t as the price that would have
resulted if the market maker could have ob-
served the private signals.
While in the long run the full information
price will converge to the true value of the asset,
this is not necessarily the case in the short or
medium run. To judge how well actual prices
incorporate available information, we first look
at convergence of final prices (i.e., prices after
the decision of the last player) to full informa-
tion final prices. Our data show that final prices
are rarely close to the final full information
price. In P  N, the final price deviates by more
than 20 percent from the final full information
price in 75 percent of groups (pooled over all
probability combinations). The option of not
trading in treatment P makes things worse,
since now 82 percent of end prices deviate by
more than 20 percent from final full information
prices. In the error treatments Pf  D  N and
P  D  N, convergence is even rarer, as in
both of these treatments 89 percent of final
prices deviate by more than 20 percent from
final full information prices.
Table 6 depicts the ratio of the final full infor-
mation price of asset A to the actual final price of
asset A, (p*T1/pT1), separately for states where
asset A is successful and where asset B is success-
ful. An important observation is that full informa-
tion prices tend to be more extreme than actual
prices. In other words, actual prices undershoot:
when state A (B) is true, the actual final price of A
is on average too low (high).
In a next step, in Figure 1 we consider the
empirical distribution of actual prices (upper
panels) and full information prices (lower pan-
els) in treatments P  N and P  Nerror pooled
over all periods and probability combination
55–60.31 In general, full information prices are
29 In equilibrium (when all subjects are ruck) own should
be about 60 percent (see, again, Web Appendix C).
30 Differences across probability combinations look sim-
ilar in treatment P N but not all combinations were played
for this treatment group.
31 Actual (full information) prices include the decision
(signal) of the current subject. The figures for treatment P
and for other probability combinations look similar. Treatment
TABLE 5—AVERAGE ruck IN TREATMENT P ACROSS
PROBABILITY COMBINATIONS
Probability combination
55–60 50–66 51–55 55–80 60–55 60–60
0.54 0.59 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.60
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
TABLE 6—RATIOS OF FULL INFORMATION FINAL PRICES TO
ACTUAL FINAL PRICES
Treatment If A is successful If B is successful
P 1.38 0.46
P  N 1.42 0.57
P  D  N 0.98 0.40
Pf  D  N 1.11 0.51
Note: Pooled over all probability combinations.
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concentrated around the a priori price. The dis-
tribution of actual prices matches this feature
well but the distributions are even more concen-
trated. Extreme prices are rarely observed. It is
interesting to see that even though a high frac-
tion of subjects behaves seemingly irrationally,
the volatility in the actual prices is less than the
volatility in the full information prices.
That deviations between the full information
and actual price can be severe is illustrated in
the left panel of Figure 2, which shows the
average deviation (p*t  pt) across full informa-
tion prices p*t (not only final ones). The graph
clearly indicates that actual prices undershoot
and are less extreme than the theoretical
prediction.
Finally, over time deviations become more
severe. The right panel of Figure 2 shows that
the average relative distance between full infor-
mation price and actual price increases.32 Note
that by construction of the price mechanism,
deviations in the early rounds must be small.
More interestingly, there is no inverted U-shape
form which would indicate convergence over
time. In the next subsection we shall consider
possible explanations for those deviations.
P N AS is omitted, as in this treatment actual prices are
equal to full information prices.
32 The observed divergence over time may explain the
higher levels of convergence reported by Cipriani and
Guarino (2005), who consider groups of 12 subjects.
FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL PRICES AND FULL INFORMATION PRICES OVER ALL PERIODS
Note: Observations from treatments P  N, P  D  N, and Pf  D  N, given probability combination 55–60.
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D. Possible Explanations: Imitation and
Contrarians
An obvious candidate explanation for ob-
served deviations from the full information
prices is herd behavior. As explained in Section
I B, rational herding is impossible in our frame-
work. However, if subjects indeed behave like
“lemmings,” they would imitate prior decisions
and thus produce herd-like behavior. We find,
however, that imitation plays no significant
role.
The first evidence against imitation in treat-
ments with flexible market prices stems from
inspecting Figures 1 and 2, which show that, on
average, actual prices are less extreme than full
information prices. Yet, imitation would predict
the opposite. If, for example, an early investor
in asset A induced later investors to buy A even
though they got a b signal, this would quickly
drive the actual price above the full information
one. Likewise, an early investor in B should
drive down the price of A more quickly than the
full information price, since imitation would
yield more buyers of B than justified by private
information.
To check more rigorously for imitation on the
individual level, we analyze whether subjects’
choices are influenced by the decisions of their
direct predecessors. If a subject is more likely to
choose A after (say) three subjects immediately
before him also chose A, we would take that as
an indication for imitative behavior. Let pred
measure the number of direct predecessors who
chose an identical action. The variable is posi-
tive if this action was A and negative if the
action was B.33 In Table 7, we report results
from logit regressions for all N treatments in
order to test whether the 0–1 variable “choice
of A” is influenced by pred.34 Besides pred, the
following explanatory variables were used: (i)
Price of A; (ii) dhint, which is a dummy variable
that was 1 if the private information of the
subjects in question was a and 0 otherwise; and
(iii) a constant and, in case of P  N, dummies
for the various probability combinations.
The dummy for private information dhint has
the expected signs and is significant. The coef-
ficient for the price of A is negative and signif-
icant in all cases (this is discussed in more detail
below). However, in all but one case, the coef-
ficients for the imitation variable pred are not
33 Alternatively, we included dummies if the number of
A or B predecessors is greater than a certain threshold. This
change was inconsequential.
34 In treatments P we ran ordered logits with the endog-
enous variable taking the values 1 (choice of A), 0 (no
trade), and 1 (choice of B), and obtained qualitatively the
same results as in P  N. Since, from a theoretical point of
view, N should never be chosen, it is not perfectly clear
whether A, B, and N can indeed be ordered. Hence, we also
ran multinomial logits which also qualitatively yielded the
same results. The independence of irrelevant alternatives
underlying the multinomial model is fulfilled.
FIGURE 2. AVERAGE PRICE DEVIATION, GIVEN A FULL INFORMATION PRICE (LEFT PANEL), AND AVERAGE RELATIVE
DISTANCE BETWEEN FULL INFORMATION PRICE AND ACTUAL PRICE OF A, GIVEN THE NUMBER IN THE GROUP (RIGHT PANEL)
Notes: The average price deviation is calculated as the difference between the full information price and the actual price of
A. Observations from treatment P  N pooled over all probability combinations.
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significantly different from zero. In P D  N,
the pred variable is significant at the 5-percent
level (p-value  0.038). It turns out, however,
that in this treatment pred is not significant if
one excludes from the regression the 7 (out of
180) cases where pred is larger or equal to 7.
That is, only after a relatively long sequence of
identical decisions do subjects seem to imitate
the choice of their predecessors. It seems that in
the presence of a flexible market price, imitation
cannot really explain our data.35
If imitation is not the right story to explain
the deviations between the full information and
actual price, what is? We suggest a story based
on contrarian behavior, which can be justified
by a regression to the mean argument. As ex-
plained above, we say that a subject is a con-
trarian if he trades against his signal and against
the market, or, equivalently, if he receives an a
(b) signal at a price for A which is strictly above
(below) the a priori price (i.e., ten times the a
priori probability for A) and deviates from his
signal to buy B (A) instead. Such contrarian
behavior can be (ex post) rational only if the
trader is convinced that prior traders irrationally
drove the price to an extreme.
Figure 3 gives evidence in favor of contrarian
behavior. It shows average frequencies of ruck
for treatment P  N and probabilities 55–60
given that the subject has received an a-signal.
The higher the price, the more likely subjects
are to trade against their signals and the lower
ruck.36 Average ruck drops from around 85
percent at low prices to around 50 percent at
high prices.
These findings are confirmed in our regres-
sion analysis (see again Table 7). High prices
for A significantly lower the probability of
choosing asset A in all regressions.
E. Does It Pay to Be a Contrarian?
While Section III D provides evidence for
contrarian behavior, the question arises whether
it is a good idea to be a contrarian (at least in the
treatments other than our benchmark treatments
P  N  AS, where the answer is always no).
There is a paradox here since contrarian behav-
ior is profitable if and only if prices are over-
valued, but if there are many contrarians, prices
are not overvalued. The current and the next
subsection will address this issue.
First, we turn to the question whether con-
trarian behavior is actually profitable. A first
aggregate look at the data suggests that this is
not the case. Table 8 lists average profits (ex-
cluding the fixed payment of 11 in the price
treatments) of subjects, depending on whether
subjects were ruck or not. In all cases, ruck
yields higher average profits. The last column of
Table 8 contains Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients between ruck and profits. All correlation
35 A multinomial logit regression of treatment P con-
firms that there is also no imitation with respect to the
no-trade decision N.
36 Other treatments and probability combinations yield
qualitatively similar figures (for both possible signal
realizations).
TABLE 7—LOGIT ANALYSIS: CHOICE OF A IN PRICE TREATMENTS
P  N Pf  D  N P  D  N P  N  AS
Price of A 0.371** 0.837** 0.330* 0.377**
(0.040) (0.323) (0.137) (0.068)
dhint 1.569** 1.540** 1.802** 1.720**
(0.112) (0.334) (0.345) (0.321)
pred 0.016 0.068 0.132* 0.065
(0.033) (0.086) (0.064) (0.068)
Observations 1659 180 180 240
2 Log-Likelihood 1985.31 216.60 210.43 269.77
R2 (Nagelkerkes) 0.230 0.221 0.256 0.295
Notes: In the regressions, all probability combinations are used. All regressions include a
constant and, in case of P  N, dummies for probability combinations. Standard deviations
are given in parentheses. ** Significantly different from 0 at the 1-percent level. * Signifi-
cantly different from 0 at the 5-percent level.
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coefficients are positive and significantly differ-
ent from zero at the 1-percent (10-percent) level
in treatments P and P  N (Pf  D  N).37
It seems plausible that contrarian behavior
might be sensible if actual prices are extreme.
To check this, we compare the profit of a con-
trarian with the counterfactual profit he would
have received had he played according to the-
ory. Since pt  (10  price of B), it is straight-
forward to show that the counterfactual payoff
is always (1) times the actual profit. If we
pool over all probabilities and consider prices
that deviate by more than two from the a priori
price p0, we get the results presented in Table
9. While in treatment P, contrarians always do
worse than their counterfactual rational sub-
jects, in treatment P  N, being a contrarian
was profitable for prices that are more than two
away from p0.38 In P  N for extreme prices, a
contrarian is actually more successful than a
counterfactual, ruck subject would be.39
F. An Error Model to Explain Contrarian
Behavior
When can contrarian behavior be optimal?
Let us assume that some traders behave like
noise traders; in particular, they choose A and B
more or less randomly. This implies that when-
ever the actual price is very high or very low, it
is likely that this was driven by noise traders. In
other words, whenever the actual price is ex-
treme, the full information price is likely to be
less extreme. Vice versa, whenever the full in-
formation price is extreme, the actual price is
likely to be less extreme, which is simply a
regression to the mean argument. Given that
traders anticipate the random behavior of noise
traders, they should be contrarians because a
low price for A yields a buying opportunity,
even if their private information is favoring B.40
Given that there are some contrarians among the
traders, actual prices will, on average, be less
extreme than theoretical ones, just as observed
in our data (see Figure 1).
37 This also holds in BHW and BHW  AS. On average,
ruck players earned 6.1 in BHW and BHW  AS, whereas
others earned 4.4 in BHW and 3.4 in BHW  AS.
38 In P  Nerror, there were hardly any observations of
potential contrarians for extreme prices, which is why these
treatments are not shown in Table 9. For intermediate
prices, contrarians earn negative profits in these treatments.
39 One possible explanation for the difference between P
and P  N is that prices in P  N have a higher variance
(3.1 rather than 2.6 in P pooled over all probability combi-
nations), which could make it more attractive to be a con-
trarian. We thank a referee for pointing that out to us.
40 This does not hold in the error treatments where the
market maker, when setting the price, takes into account
that not all subjects follow their signal.
TABLE 8—AVERAGE PROFITS AND ruck
Treatment
Average profits of
subjects classified as Correlation
coefficientsruck  1 ruck  0
P 1.3 0.5 0.21**
P  N 1.0 0.4 0.13**
P  D  N 0.1 1.1 0.10
Pf  D  N 0.6 0.8 0.13*
Notes: Pooled over all probability combinations. Profits
exclude fixed payments. ** Significantly different from 0 at
the 1-percent level. * Significantly different from 0 at the
10-percent level.
TABLE 9—CONTRARIANS’ AVERAGE PROFITS IN DIFFERENT
PRICE REGIONS
pt  p0  2 2  pt  p0  2 pt  p0  2
P 0.4 0.8 0.5
P  N 0.9 0.0 0.9
Notes: Pooled over all probability combinations. Profits
exclude fixed payments. p0 denotes the a priori price.
FIGURE 3. AVERAGE ruck GIVEN AN a SIGNAL ACROSS
ACTUAL PRICES OF A
Notes: Observations from treatment P  N, given proba-
bility combination 55–60. More extreme prices than those
shown are omitted due to low numbers of observations.
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As discussed in the introduction, in this sub-
section, we explicitly incorporate the possibility
that subjects could be aware of the fact that
others make mistakes. The error model is based
on the concept of quantal response equilibrium
of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998). In par-
ticular, it is assumed that subjects choose the
correct action according to a logit function that
depends on the difference in payoffs between
the two alternatives.41 If the difference is large,
the correct action is chosen with high probabil-
ity. If it is small, mistakes are more likely.
Analogous to Anderson and Holt (1997), we
estimate error parameters t for treatment P 
N recursively for each round t  1, ... , 20,
taking into account that predecessors have re-
acted to possible earlier errors. (For details of
the estimation and for all coefficient estimates,
see Web Appendix D.)42 The coefficients for
the t range between 0.58 and 0.08, and all but
one of the 20 coefficients, are significant at the
5-percent level.43
As it turns out, if one pools over all proba-
bility combinations, average ruck in the error
model (denoted by ruck  ) and ruck under
the standard model are both equal to 0.67.44 We
believe that this is due to the fact that, in our
case, errors do not change the optimal actions
for most prices, even though expected profits do
change. This can be seen in the left panel of
Figure 4, which shows average expected profits
of buying asset A given an a signal depending
on the assumptions with respect to errors of
predecessors (treatment P  N, 55–60). In the
standard model, where agents hold the belief
that all agents follow their signal, it is always
optimal to follow one’s signal as well. Not so
with the error model. The left panel of Figure
4 shows that, at low or moderate prices for asset
A, agents should optimally follow an a signal,
but at high prices contrarian behavior is opti-
mal. Given the left panel of Figure 4, it is not
surprising that average ruck at moderate prices
is similar under both definitions of rationality.
Only at very high and very low prices, ruck
41 Since in treatment P each subject has three possible
choices, we do not estimate an error model for this
treatment.
42 The error model above assumes a full level of reason-
ing. See Ku¨bler and Weizsa¨cker (2004) for an estimation
with various degrees of reasoning.
43 In order to make our coefficients comparable to those
of Anderson and Holt (1997), one has to multiply them by
approximately five to account for the larger range in payoffs
in our experiment (see Web Appendix D for details). Nev-
ertheless, our estimates are somewhat smaller.
44 We have analyzed two additional error models. First,
in an iterative process, we estimated a constant parameter 
across all rounds: in each iteration, expected profits were
calculated by using the error parameter obtained in the
previous estimation, and we observed convergence of 
after approximately 20 iterations. Second, we also analyzed
a simpler error model in which the error probability was
assumed to be constant, i.e., history-independent. The re-
sults from both of these modified error models are qualita-
tively the same as those reported above.
FIGURE 4. AVERAGE EXPECTED NET PROFITS OF BUYING ASSET A GIVEN AN a SIGNAL (LEFT PANEL), AND AVERAGE ruck
(RIGHT PANEL) IN THE STANDARD MODEL AND IN THE ERROR MODEL ACROSS PRICES
Note: Observations from treatment P  N given probability combination 55–60.
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increases in P  N if one allows for the possi-
bility of errors (see the right panel of Figure 4).
These results have implications for the dis-
cussion about “noise traders” in market micro-
structure models. As discussed earlier, in a
model where there are only informed traders
and where a market maker sets a bid-ask spread,
the no-trade theorem would apply. To avoid
this, most market microstructure models intro-
duce noise traders ad hoc.45
First, our results suggest that “noise” seems
to emerge automatically due to the irrationality
of some of the traders. This becomes especially
obvious in our P  N  AS treatments where,
pooled over all probability combinations, aver-
age rationality is still only 65 percent. This
observation, together with the fact that even
under the error model ruck does not exceed 70
percent, suggests that the problem is not so
much extracting the relevant information from
the decision of predecessors as it is processing it
correctly. Second, our data provide support for
the hypothesis that each agent decides ratio-
nally with a certain probability, as opposed to
the hypothesis that some of the subjects always
decide rationally while others always decide
irrationally. This can be seen by considering the
80 subjects who played three times P  N 
AS, which does not require assumptions with
respect to the rationality of predecessors. Table
10 depicts how many of these subjects made
zero, one, two, or three rational decisions. A
two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals
that this distribution is not significantly differ-
ent (at any conventional level) from a distribu-
tion that would result if each of these subjects
had always decided rationally with probability
0.6542, which is the average value of ruck in
P  N  AS.
G. The Influence of Personal Characteristics
With the large number of participants in our
experiment, it is possible to investigate the be-
havior of a variety of subgroups. For the price
treatments, Table 11 compares average ruck of
male and female subjects, subjects who are cur-
rent or former students (“college”), subjects
who have never attended college (“no college”),
subjects holding a Ph.D. degree, and current
Ph.D. students. To test for differences, we ran
logit regressions at the individual level to ex-
plain the rationality variable ruck by dummies
for the subgroups above. Controlling for the
duration of play, the age of the subject, and its
position in the group, we find that neither the
sex of the subject nor the college dummy is
significant at conventional levels. There is,
however, evidence that the 13.3 percent Ph.D.s
in our subject pool have a significantly higher
ruck (with a p-value of 0.068).46
As a large part of our subject pool had some
university education, we asked subjects for their
major field of study, as it should be interesting
whether there are differences in behavior. Fig-
ure 5 depicts average ruck and profits (exclud-
ing fixed payments) in the price treatments for
selected fields of study. As expected, with re-
spect to ruck, physicists, but also economists,
perform above average. Business students are
slightly below average and psychologists45 To justify the presence of noise traders, it has been
argued that (rational) noise traders act due to liquidity or
hedging needs (see, e.g., Lawrence Ausubel, 1990) or due to
incentives arising from optimal delegation contracts for
portfolio managers (see, e.g., James Dow and Gary Gorton,
1997). Following Fischer Black (1986), there is a strand of
the literature in which noise traders are seen as traders that
trade on noise as if it were information or as agents who just
act randomly.
46 Controlling for the field of studies reveals that this
effect is mainly driven by Ph.D.s from the sciences, medi-
cine, and engineering. Surprisingly, there is no significant
Ph.D. effect in economics. We also included a dummy to
reflect whether a subject had provided an invalid e-mail
address (see Footnote 19). This dummy is not significant.
TABLE 10—FREQUENCY OF ruck WHEN PLAYING
P  N  AS THREE TIMES
0 1 2 3
Frequency in actual data 0.063 0.213 0.425 0.300
Expected if rational with
probability 0.6542
0.041 0.235 0.444 0.280
TABLE 11—AVERAGE ruck OF SUBGROUPS IN PRICE
TREATMENTS
Male Female College
No
college Ph.D.
Ph.D.
students All
0.60 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.60
Note: Data from treatment groups P, P  N, P  N  AS,
and P  Nerror pooled over all probability combinations.
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performed worst. If one looks at profits, how-
ever, the ranking is almost exactly reversed.
Physicists and economists do much worse than
psychologists. A high ruck is not necessarily a
virtue if others are irrational. This suggests that
sometimes an intuition for the possibly irratio-
nal behavior of others seems to be more impor-
tant than being able to apply Bayes’s rule.
While we should not overemphasize those re-
sults (recall that profits may vary from 10 to
10 and standard deviations are rather large),
we do find one interesting behavioral difference
between the two extreme groups—psycholo-
gists and physicists. Define a potential contrar-
ian situation as a situation when the price for
asset S is strictly higher than the a priori price of
S and the subject receives a signal in favor of S,
where S  {A, B}. It turns out that in potential
contrarian situations, psychologists act more of-
ten like actual contrarians than physicists do (in
59 percent of potential contrarian situations ver-
sus 39 percent for physicists). And this is not
due to the fact that psychologists are more likely
to trade against their signal in general. In fact, in
noncontrarian situations, psychologists trade
against their signal in only 15 percent of cases
(versus 17 percent for physicists).
H. Are Consultants Different?
A common (and justified) critique against
experiments in economics is that, with few ex-
ceptions, they rely on a subject pool consisting
only of economics students. While this can be
changed with relatively little effort, the reliance
on students in general is often dictated by fi-
nancial and practical constraints. This makes it
all the more important that outside validity is
checked when one has the rare opportunity to
conduct experiments with professionals in busi-
ness. We were able to conduct the experiment
on the same platform with 267 McKinsey con-
sultants.47 Do their results differ?
Originally we used a different text version in
the control experiment.48 To verify whether
consultants behaved differently, all four combi-
nations of general subject pool/consultants and
old text/new text were played in treatment P 
D and probability combination 55–60 (which
was the only probability combination played in
the control treatment with consultants). Table
12 shows average ruck for these combinations.
For both text versions, the consultants have
slightly higher values of ruck but none of the
differences is significant at the 5-percent level
47 The group size in this control experiment was always
limited to ten, and sometimes five. Testing revealed, how-
ever, that this has no significant effect.
48 The new text was more precise about the indepen-
dence of the investment bankers’ tips. In the general phase,
the two different text versions did not yield significantly
different results, and hence the groups with old text were
always included in the previous results.
FIGURE 5. AVERAGE ruck (LEFT PANEL) AND AVERAGE PROFITS (RIGHT PANEL) FOR SELECTED FIELDS OF STUDY
Notes: Observations from treatments P, P N, P N AS, and P Nerror, pooled over all probability combinations. Profits
exclude fixed payments.
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of a MWU-test (two-sided). Thus, the control
group of consultants does not behave signifi-
cantly different from our general subject pool.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we present results of a large-
scale Internet experiment based on a sequential
asset market with privately informed traders.
Avery and Zemsky (1998) predict that in such
markets, herd behavior should not be observed
because all trade decisions are immediately in-
corporated into the market price which, conse-
quently, reflects all public information. And,
indeed, as predicted, we do not find evidence for
herding or imitative behavior in our experiment.
In contrast to theory, however, subjects do not
always follow their private information, but fre-
quently act as contrarians, i.e., they trade
against the market and their own signal. To
explain this behavior, we study an error model
which allows for the possibility that subjects
have doubts about the rationality of others and
consequently mistrust their decisions. The error
model is able to rationalize contrarian behavior
at relatively low or high prices. In fact, a very
successful strategy in the price treatments
would have been to follow one’s signal for
moderate prices and to be a contrarian for high
prices. The fact that contrarian behavior occurs
even in our error treatments Pf  D  N and
P  D  N, and in treatments P  N  AS,
however, suggests that it cannot be fully ex-
plained by an optimal response to errors.
Our experiment complements a large empir-
ical literature on herding. Our results confirm
the finding of the bulk of this literature that herd
behavior driven by informational externalities
does not seem to be an important force in fi-
nancial markets. To the contrary, one could
even argue that the observed contrarian behav-
ior, which we find sometimes to be profitable,
has a stabilizing effect as it implies that agents
tend to differentiate their investments from
those of their predecessors. Of course, this does
not rule out herding in financial markets based
on explanations other than purely information-
based ones, as, for example, reputation concerns
and payoff externalities. To disentangle these
factors is an important task for future empirical
and experimental research.
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